The 2014 Provincial Election in Quebec by Bélanger, Éric & Falk Pedersen, Eva
The Canadian Political Science Review Vol. 9, No. 2, 2015 pp. 112-120 
112 
 
The 2014 Provincial Election in Quebec 
 
 
 
 
Éric Bélanger and Eva Falk Pedersen 
Department of Political Science 
McGill University 
eric.belanger3@mcgill.ca and eva.falkpedersen@mail.mcgill.ca 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
After having been in power for just a little over a year and a half, the Parti Québécois 
government led by Pauline Marois decided to call an early election in the hope of getting 
the majority of seats that had evaded them the last time around. That bet was lost as the 
2014 election campaign resulted in the worst showing for the PQ since 1973. The inter-
election period was dominated by the debate over the PQ’s proposed Charter of Quebec 
Values. The Charter also influenced the debate during the campaign, as did the issue of 
Quebec’s sovereignty due in part to the arrival of Pierre Karl Péladeau as a star candidate 
for the PQ. The Liberal Party of Quebec is now back in government with a majority of 
seats and under the leadership of Philippe Couillard. 
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Introduction 
 
After less than two years spent on the 
official opposition benches of Quebec’s 
National Assembly, the Liberal Party of 
Quebec (PLQ) was back in government 
with a majority of seats and under the 
leadership of Philippe Couillard 
following the provincial election of April 
7
th
 2014. That election’s result 
represented the worst vote share of the 
incumbent Parti Québécois’ history since 
1973. The previous 2012 election had 
been groundbreaking since it was the 
first time in Quebec’s history that a 
woman was elected as Premier. Yet, the 
2014 election is also historic not only 
due to the PQ’s demise but also because 
that same woman, Pauline Marois, has 
been defeated in her own riding 
(Charlevoix-Côte-de-Beaupré) after just 
a short reign of 19 months. 
 
That short period in power was 
dominated by the debate surrounding a 
controversial piece of legislation that 
encapsulated the Marois government’s 
willingness to tackle the issue of 
secularism in the province’s public 
institutions. Bernard Drainville, the 
Minister responsible for Democratic 
Institutions and Active Citizenship, 
made this policy proposal public on 
September 10, 2013 under the name of 
“Charter of Quebec Values.”1 The 
legislation aimed at reinforcing the 
secular nature of Quebec society and at 
facilitating the adoption of the so-called 
                                                 
1
 The actual legislation, Bill 60, “Charter 
affirming the values of State secularism and 
religious neutrality and of equality between 
women and men, and providing a framework for 
accommodation requests” was introduced in the 
National Assembly on November 7
th
 2013. It was 
never adopted due to the snap election call made 
just a few months later. 
“valeurs québécoises” by the immigrant 
population – and, hence, the protection 
and promotion of those values. The 
proposed Charter had several provisions, 
including enshrining the values of 
secularism in the Quebec Charter of 
Human Rights and Freedoms (Charte 
des droits et libertés de la personne), 
indicating that the gender equality 
provisions of the Charter of Human 
Rights and Freedoms should be 
interpreted within a secular framework, 
outlining a framework for how the 
government would respond to requests 
for religious accommodation, and 
obliging those seeking public services to 
present themselves with their face 
uncovered (Assemblée nationale du 
Québec 2013). 
 
However, much of the attention focused 
on the provision to ban “ostentatious 
religious symbols” (signes religieux 
ostentatoires) in public employment. 
The proposed ban on the wearing of 
religious symbols by all public 
employees was indeed the object of most 
of the criticisms aimed at the Charter. 
First, defining what is ostentatious 
triggered a fair amount of op-eds, 
editorials, and news articles. Second, the 
PQ had already decided that the crucifix 
on the wall of the National Assembly in 
Quebec would be there to stay because it 
was part of Quebec’s cultural heritage. 
Third, many actors considered the 
provision to be unconstitutional as it was 
seen to be an attack on the individuals’ 
freedom to express their religious 
beliefs. In good part for this reason, both 
the Liberals and Québec Solidaire (QS) 
were strongly against the Charter 
project; for its part, the Coalition Avenir 
Québec (CAQ) was more conciliatory on 
the topic and said that if Quebecers 
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wanted a Charter then there should be 
one (Société Radio-Canada 2013). 
Finally, many societal actors accused the 
PQ of fuelling and exploiting fear 
towards immigrants as an electoral 
strategy. Indeed, there was considerable 
speculation at the time that Pauline 
Marois wanted to call an early election 
before the end of the year. 
 
According to CROP polling results, vote 
intentions for the PQ significantly 
declined between December 2012 (36%) 
and June 2013 (25%), while support for 
the PLQ showed the opposite trend 
(increasing from 25 to 38 percent) 
thanks to that party’s leadership race 
which led to the selection of Philippe 
Couillard as new Liberal leader but also 
to a rather chaotic first few months in 
power for the PQ. Since the Lac-
Mégantic rail disaster of July 2013 
where the Marois government had been 
applauded for its quick reaction, vote 
intentions in favour of the PQ had been 
slowly but surely on the rise, but the 
party still remained behind the PLQ. In a 
secluded retreat held in late October 
2013, Marois and her caucus decided to 
postpone the election call, feeling that a 
bit more time was needed for the Charter 
debate to have an impact on public 
opinion that would be more clearly in 
favour of the government’s position on 
this issue (Nadeau 2013).  In addition, 
Minister of Finance Nicolas Marceau 
announced in late November that his 
government’s next budget, to be 
presented the following spring, would 
unfortunately remain in deficit (of $2.5 
billion). This new element further 
reduced the PQ’s window of opportunity 
for going to the polls. February 2014 
public surveys confirmed the rise in PQ 
vote intentions since the introduction of 
Bill 60 in November and now showed 
the party to be ahead of the Liberals, 
thus cementing Pauline Marois’ plans to 
call an election campaign on March 5
th
. 
 
In terms of electoral organization, two 
things changed between the 2012 and the 
2014 elections. For the first time, polling 
stations were allowed to be installed on 
university and college campuses. If they 
wish so, students can now have their 
ballot cast on campus be counted as a 
ballot cast in their home riding. This is 
part of the electoral officer’s strategy to 
enhance youth’s electoral participation; 
in addition, this new rule helps reduce 
the bias induced by student over-
representation in ridings in which 
educational institutions are present. The 
second institutional change is related to 
party funding. The new financing rules 
adopted by the Marois government were 
aimed at reducing the influence of 
donors in the wake of revelations made 
at the Charbonneau Commission. The 
maximum is now set at 100 dollars per 
donation per year, accompanied by 
greater support from public funds. 
 
The Campaign 
 
Contrary to the previous election where 
the Quebec party system had seen the 
emergence of two new formations (the 
Coalition Avenir Québec, having merged 
with the former Action Démocratique du 
Québec, and Option Nationale created 
by dissidents from the PQ), no new 
important parties have emerged in 2014. 
The three major parties kicked off their 
campaign by emphasizing the economy 
and the issue of unemployment. The first 
official campaign press conference given 
by the PQ did not go unnoticed. Indeed, 
Pauline Marois did not field any 
questions from journalists on this 
occasion. This “minimum exposition” 
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approach was considered as suspect by 
the press, and Marois was even 
compared to Prime Minister of Canada 
Stephen Harper who is known for over-
controlling information (Laurence 2014). 
 
Even if parties started campaigning on 
the economy, the rest of the campaign 
was quickly re-centred around other 
issues, notably the ongoing debate about 
the province’s constitutional future and 
the PQ’s proposed Charter of Values. By 
the second day of the campaign, Marois 
had justified this early election call by 
saying that she wanted a majority of 
seats so as to be able to adopt the Charter 
and she invited all voters, no matter if 
they were in favour of Quebec’s 
independence or not, to vote for her 
party (Journet and Lessard 2014). The 
leader of the PLQ, Philippe Couillard, 
accused Marois of misleading voters 
since her party clearly supports 
independence. The PLQ reiterated their 
commitment against that project while 
promoting the recognition of the distinct 
character of the province in the Canadian 
constitution. As their slogan indicated 
(“Ensemble, on s’occupe des vraies 
affaires”) the Liberals opposed the PQ’s 
divisive priorities of independence and 
the Charter with a focus on the economy, 
pledging the creation of 100,000 jobs 
during their first mandate (Chouinard 
2014). 
 
It is impossible to speak about this 
campaign without speaking about some 
of its featured candidates. A few days 
before the campaign started, well-known 
doctor Gaétan Barrette, who had 
unsuccessfully run for the CAQ in the 
2012 election, announced that he would 
run this time for the PLQ and would face 
Fatima Houda-Pepin in the riding of La 
Pinière. Houda-Pepin, a Liberal MNA 
for the last 20 years, had decided to run 
again as an independent candidate due to 
a disagreement over her former party’s 
legalist position on the issue of 
secularism (Canadian Press 2013). 
Barrette would win the seat by a large 
margin.  Martine Desjardins, who had 
been a students’ union leader during the 
2012 maple spring crisis, also decided to 
jump into electoral politics under the PQ 
banner, but she did not get elected 
despite the increased media visibility she 
had received in the years since the crisis. 
 
But the most notable new personality in 
the 2014 campaign was Pierre Karl 
Péladeau. Owner of the largest media 
consortium in the province (Québecor) 
and very well known throughout Quebec 
often just by his initials (PKP), Péladeau 
announced on March 9
th
 that he would 
run for the Parti Québécois in the riding 
of Saint-Jérôme after having denied 
rumours about it just a few months 
before. His nomination as candidate 
raised a number of ethical concerns, with 
many arguing that he ought to sell his 
shares of Québecor in the event that he 
would become MNA. Péladeau refused 
to do so and instead stressed that, if 
elected, he would respect all the rules 
mentioned in the National Assembly’s 
code of ethics (Chouinard et al. 2014). 
The announcement of his candidacy was 
also notable due to the fact that Péladeau 
fist-pumped the air while claiming that 
he was running “to make Québec a 
country!” This spontaneous cry from the 
heart on the part of such a high-profile 
PQ candidate undesirably served to bring 
the independence issue to the fore. It 
fuelled concerns over Marois’ 
willingness to prepare a third referendum 
on the issue if re-elected with a majority, 
a possibility that was alluded to by a few 
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of her cabinet’s members just before the 
election call (Salvet 2014). 
With the two traditional parties fighting 
over the referendum debate, the other 
parties struggled to stand out. The CAQ 
tried to shift the debate away from the 
national question by bringing up 
spending cuts in the health agencies’ 
budgets, by proposing to forbid trade 
unions from spending money for 
political causes other than labour, and by 
suggesting to reduce the size of the state 
and to reform the senior civil service 
organization. Québec Solidaire, which is 
another party that wants to further prime 
left-right issues, experienced even a 
harder time putting their agenda up front. 
Co-leader Françoise David tried to 
attract voters disillusioned with the PQ 
(particularly the youth) by stating that, 
unlike the PQ, QS is a genuine social-
democratic party (Teisceira-Lessard 
2014). QS also tried to bring up public 
health issues by proposing to recruit 800 
more health professionals, and reiterated 
its opposition to the Charter of Values. 
Hence, even if Quebec Solidaire has a 
strong position in favour of Quebec 
sovereignty, both the CAQ and QS tried 
to overcome the traditional debate about 
independence versus federalism. In spite 
of their efforts, the national question 
remained at the forefront of the 
campaign. This became clear when 
Pauline Marois felt the obligation to 
specify, right at the start of the March 
20
th
 televised leaders debate, that she 
would not hold a referendum on 
sovereignty unless Quebecers were 
“ready” for it – a position that proved to 
be as evasive as ever (Boisvert 2014). 
 
The Liberals having clearly taken the 
lead in vote intention polls by then, they 
became the target of the campaign for 
the rest of its duration. Philippe 
Couillard’s credibility was attacked on 
two fronts: his personal integrity was 
questioned with references made to his 
past (his work in Saudi Arabia and his 
business ties with controversial figure 
Arthur Porter) and his apparent lack of 
nationalist fervor (his legalist position on 
secularism and his defence of 
bilingualism) was criticized. The PQ 
adopted a “Cerberus” approach: 
Drainville focused on the Charter of 
Values, Péladeau concentrated on the 
economy, while Marois stood in the 
middle to coordinate the party’s message 
(Lessard 2014). After an unconvincing 
performance in the first televised debate, 
CAQ leader François Legault came back 
in force in the second one broadcasted 
on March 27
th
. A poll published four 
days later still placed the PLQ ahead but 
also showed an increase in support for 
the CAQ. This surge allowed the party to 
avoid a possible collapse but it came too 
late to make a real breakthrough. We can 
finally note that the campaign was 
punctuated by various small events such 
as a large-scale demonstration in 
Montreal against the Charter of Values, a 
semi-scandal regarding a supposed 
increase in the number of voting list 
registrations in the riding of Sainte-
Marie-Saint-Jacques by Anglophone 
students, and many accusations of illegal 
financing towards different parties. 
 
The Outcome and Its Aftermath 
 
The Marois government was defeated on 
the night of Monday, April 7
th
, after 
having governed for less than two years. 
Philippe Couillard, leader of the PLQ, 
became Premier of Quebec at the head of 
a majority government. His party 
received more than 40% of the vote and 
succeeded in electing 70 of their 
candidates (see Table 1). 
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While the 2012 election had seen the PQ 
and the PLQ as tight competitors – with 
a difference in support of less than one 
percentage point – the 2014 election 
indicated a clear downfall for the Parti 
Québécois. The party only received 25% 
of ballots cast which translated into 30 
seats. Pauline Marois resigned on 
election night after making a plea for 
youth’s and women’s involvement in 
politics. Most commentators consider 
that the effect of the Charter has cost the 
PQ a number of Montreal ridings due to 
a lack of identification of the voters to 
this identity-based issue (e.g., Boucher 
2014). In addition, the PQ lost support in 
the suburban area of Montreal; the 
northern shore of Montreal opted instead 
for the CAQ, while the Laval region 
preferred the Liberals. In retrospect, it 
seems clear that the PQ’s defeat mainly 
resulted as much from an anti-
referendum vote triggered by Péladeau’s 
presence (and the Liberals’ discourse 
about it) than from an anti-Charter vote 
(and a split of the pro-Charter vote 
between the PQ and the CAQ). Because 
each of these two issues strongly 
mobilized voters who were against 
them, they both ended up favouring the 
PLQ. 
 
As for the CAQ, it received a 23% share 
of the vote and managed to elect 22 of its 
candidates at the National Assembly. 
Compared to the 2012 election, this 
result represented both a setback in 
terms of popular vote share (-4 
percentage points) and an improvement 
in terms of seats won (+3). This 
paradoxical outcome offers a good 
example of the discrepancies that can be 
brought about by the single-member 
plurality (SMP) voting system. We can 
infer from these numbers that the CAQ’s 
support was more concentrated in some 
ridings, which is a necessary condition to 
elect representatives under a SMP 
system (for a study of the geography of 
the CAQ’s support, see Forest 2013). 
 
Table 1. Quebec Provincial Election Results 
 2012 2014 
 Seats 
(#) 
Popular vote 
(%) 
Seats 
(#) 
Popular vote 
(%) 
Parti Libéral du Québec 50 31.2 70 41.5 
Parti Québécois 54 32.0 30 25.4 
Coalition Avenir Québec  19 27.1 22 23.1 
Québec Solidaire   2   6.0   3 7.6 
Option Nationale   0   1.9   0  0.7 
Parti Vert Quebec   0   1.0   0  0.6 
Source: Directeur général des élections du Québec (www.dgeq.qc.ca) 
 
Looking at the smaller parties, we can 
see that Québec Solidaire continued to 
slowly gain support. Since the 2008 
provincial election, the party has always 
been able to get one extra candidate 
elected. Amir Khadir and Françoise 
David have respectively been elected in 
2008 and 2012. The 2014 election saw 
Manon Massé, a well-known feminist 
and lesbian activist, being elected under 
the QS banner. Across the province, the 
party won 7.6% of the popular vote 
which represents a slight increase 
compared to its 2012 vote share. The 
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three ridings where QS succeeded in 
electing candidates are all located in the 
downtown area of the Montreal Island; 
and the party finished second in two 
other ridings of Montreal (Laurier-
Dorion and Hochelaga-Maisonneuve). 
As for the Green Party of Quebec and 
Option Nationale, they both continued to 
decline and received negligible shares of 
the vote (less than one percentage point 
province-wide). 
 
Overall, these results are interesting 
because it is the first time in Quebec that 
a party won the election with such a 
majority while having so many other 
parties represented in parliament. 
Considering that the SMP voting system 
usually fosters two-party systems, the 
province of Quebec seems to be an 
exception to the rule for the time being 
or perhaps is becoming more “Canadian” 
this way (for a recent assessment of the 
evolution of Quebec’s party system, see 
Godbout 2013). In terms of turnout, the 
2014 participation rate of 71.4% was 
slightly lower than in 2012 (74.6%). The 
2014 turnout tends to fit with the overall 
decrease in electoral participation that is 
being experienced across many Western 
democracies. The 2008 election marked 
a strong downfall in electoral 
participation (only 57% of voters casted 
a ballot that year) but this proved to be 
an exception as the following two 
contests (2012 and 2014) saw a return to 
more “normal” – although still declining 
– turnout rates (see Blais, Galais, and 
Gélineau 2013). In an analysis of riding-
level voting and non-voting patterns in 
the 2014 election, Montigny and his 
colleagues (2014) found that the victory 
of Liberal candidates was greatly helped 
in the ridings that experienced an 
increase in turnout. 
 
When forming his ministerial cabinet, 
Premier Philippe Couillard has tried to 
achieve a balance by choosing former 
ministers from the Jean Charest era 
(2003-2012) that are experienced (Jean-
Marc Fournier, Lise Thériault, Sam 
Hamad, Laurent Lessard, etc.) but also 
by appointing people new to the cabinet 
(Martin Coiteux, Carlos Leitão, Hélène 
David, Robert Poëti, Gaétan Barrette, 
etc.). Given that the next election is 
scheduled by law for 2018, Couillard has 
the luxury of time (Marissal 2014) and 
so the new Liberal government has 
decided to spend its first two years 
implementing a number of “austerity” 
measures in order to reach a balanced 
budget by 2016. The first year of the 
government has gone by relatively 
smoothly. Several manifestations against 
austerity have been organized by left-
leaning groups, mostly in Montreal and 
Quebec City, but opinion polls seem to 
indicate that a majority of Quebecers are 
supportive of the Liberals’ tough 
budgetary measures (the Liberal wins in 
two by-elections held in June 2015 have 
been interpreted as further evidence of 
popular support for Couillard’s budget 
decisions). Some were even fearing a 
new “maple spring” in 2015 but student 
mobilization, lacking a key rallying issue 
like the tuition fee hikes had been back 
in 2012 (see Bélanger and Falk Pedersen 
2014), proved not as strong this time 
around and the protest movement 
quickly petered out. 
 
Understandably, the result of the 2014 
election has been a brutal shock for the 
Parti Québécois. Members of the party 
have spoken publicly about the need for 
the PQ to engage in a deep and a long 
reflection about its future and its 
priorities. Part of this reflection exercise 
was accomplished during the leadership 
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race that led to the selection in May 
2015 of Pierre Karl Péladeau as the new 
PQ leader, officially defeating Alexandre 
Cloutier and Martine Ouellet while two 
other candidates, Bernard Drainville and 
Pierre Céré, withdrew during the 
leadership campaign (Jean-François 
Lisée withdrew before the campaign 
even began). However, since the race did 
not end up being much of a close one, 
Péladeau was able to surf toward the 
finish without committing himself much 
in terms of future policy orientations for 
the party. Even on the issue of 
sovereignty, while being clearly 
committed to working toward making 
Quebec a sovereign country, the new PQ 
leader has refused so far to clarify his 
strategy and calendar for holding a third 
referendum on this question. Thus, the 
PQ remains stuck between a rock and a 
hard place – between its platform’s top 
priority of making independence and the 
necessity of first getting into power in 
order to act on it – due to the fact that the 
idea of sovereignty lacks momentum 
among the Quebec population, at least 
for the time being (see also Maioni 
2014). In any case, because of 
Péladeau’s presence at the head of the 
PQ, the 2018 campaign is likely to end 
up being as polarized around the national 
question as before. If so, it may well 
become a make-or-break election for the 
Parti Québécois and its constitutional 
option. 
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